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Abstract 
The article discusses new regulations implemented in Poland with a view to increasing 
budgetary VAT revenues through sealing the system, and in particular through reducing 
tax fraud. The Author's main objective is an analysis of the various available instruments 
and their evaluation from the perspective of improvement of the effectiveness of tax 
collection, but also from the perspective of protection of taxpayers' rights, for the actions of 
the fiscal apparatus cannot be overly burdensome on entrepreneurs as they hinder their 
development. The article, which utilises the comparative and statistical method, features an 
analysis of legislation. 
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1. Introduction 
The functioning of each state requires that its authorities have the necessary financial 
resources, making it possible to cover public expenditure. Hence, the state collects revenues 
to carry out tasks (expenditure) regarded as essential, necessary, needed or recommended. 
The primary sources of budgetary revenues are taxes, which in 2017 covered 84% of state 
budget expenditure in Poland. Considering that VAT revenues that year accounted for 
49.7% of fiscal revenues of the state budget, the importance of this tax cannot be overstated. 
What follows is that the loss of VAT revenues is a major problem not just in Poland, but 
also in other European Union member states. According to data published at 
https://ec.europa.eu, France and Germany, both of which are near the EU average, incur 
losses more than twice as high as those of Poland, whose losses are estimated at 25% of 
projected proceeds (33-55 billion PLN). The so-called "VAT gap", whose existence is a fact, 
constitutes a major weakening of, or even a threat to, the development of the economy of 
the entire European Union. Therefore, the legislative and executive authorities are looking 
for optimal legal solutions and effective application of those.  
During the period between November 2015 and September 2018, Poland introduced 28 
changes regarding the VAT. Of those, 22 led (directly or indirectly) to an increase in 
budgetary revenues linked to VAT, and 21 served to "seal" the system. The changes were 
necessary, as the years 2013-2015 abounded with VAT fraud. This was also the period 
when the use of fake invoices escalated, fraudsters created various structures to feign intra-
Community supplies, and the effectiveness of tax authorities in fighting VAT fraud was 
insufficient. 
The new legal instruments intended to prevent the loss of VAT revenues include the 
reverse charge mechanism, Standard Audit File for Tax (PL Jednolity Plik Kontrolny; JPK), 
IT System of the Clearing House (PL System Teleinformatyczny Izby Rozliczeniowej, 
STIR), VAT penalty rates, Fuel Package and Energy Package (PL Pakiet paliwowy and 
Pakiet energetyczny, respectively), split payment mechanism, increased sanctions for VAT 
fraud in the penal code, and consolidation of revenue and customs authorities. 
 
2. Reverse charge mechanism 
The reverse change mechanism has been in use for several years to monitor the trade in 
selected goods (e.g. steel rods, coffee, tea, and electronics) in those segments of the market 
with anomalies, in particular fraudulent behaviours, including ones involving invoices that 
did not reflect actual transactions. Starting from 2017, Poland decided to apply this 
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mechanism also to some services, namely renovation and building works. This resulted in 
major difficulties, or even chaos, in identification of services with respect to which reverse 
charge was to be applied. Whereas identification of goods based on nomenclature used in 
statistical classifications does not raise difficulties, under market economy conditions the 
experiment involving services, and such sensitive ones at that, can hardly be considered 
successful.  
While it is true that goods covered by this mechanism cannot be used for fraud based on 
"empty" invoices, this cannot be said of other areas, which are easily affected. This in turn 
means that revenues from hitherto taxable market segments decrease, as given the absence 
of an output tax burden with a simultaneous right to an input tax deduction (equivalent of 
the 0% rate), bogus supplies covered by this mechanism make it possible to create a surplus 
of input tax over output tax and enable a VAT return fraud without having to recourse to 
feign an intra-Community supply of goods. What follows is that revenues only accrue to 
the state budget if goods are later sold to end consumers, whereas many of the goods 
covered by this mechanism are not available in retail (e.g. steel or copper), and trade in 
these goods is largely bogus. As a result, such transactions never translate into a value 
added with a real tax burden, and the goods merely serve as a carrier for fraudulent 
deductions and "disappear" in the same way that "vanishing traders" do. Furthermore, 
similar goods are also sold under pretence of goods covered by the reverse charge 
mechanism. This applies in particular to goods whose identity cannot be ascertained, 
especially post-use (e.g. steel as scrap metal). What that means is that a segment of the 
market that is subject to normal VAT arrangements becomes excluded from taxation, and 
taxpayers who actually trade in goods covered by reverse charge purchase them from 
abroad at net prices or from suppliers exempt from VAT to avoid the need to recover input 
tax through a tax return from the inland revenue (prolonged time and risk of control). As a 
result, the greater the scope of reverse charge, the lower the demand for goods and services 
subject to taxation under normal arrangements on the domestic market. This mechanism 
also makes it possible for entities misrepresenting their identity to obtain goods or services 
at net prices under false pretences. Whenever this is the case, tax authorities first demand 
the output tax from the entity whose data was used, and only later – from the seller who, 
through his lack of due diligence, let this situation happen.  
No reliable statistics showed an increase in budgetary revenues that would be linked to this 
mechanism. In fact, the opposite is the case – data point to an increase in the number of tax 
declarations showing a return of VAT and the amounts of those reimbursements (that is an 
effective revenue shortfall in the state budget), as well as an increase in the trading volumes 
of goods and services covered by this mechanism for which there is no real need (that is 
bogus trading intended to create VAT returns). Hence, the reverse charge turns out to be a 
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mechanism that is not only ineffective, but also makes it difficult to heal the VAT system 
[Radzikowski 2018: 178-179]. 
 
3. Standard Audit File for Tax (SAF-T) 
The Standard Audit File for Tax (SAF-T) was introduced by Article 193a of the Tax 
Ordinance Act, and has been applicable to some entities since 1 July 2016. The 
introduction of the SAF-T enables taxpayers to submit information to tax authorities in 
electronic form, which makes it less time-consuming and troublesome, and which as a 
result helps to reduce costs and contributes to improving the effectiveness of irregularities 
and tax fraud. Tax authorities receive current data that they can analyse and use for control 
purposes. The SAF-T involves electronic exchange of two types of data: 1) automatically – 
monthly purchases and sales records, which is sent by 25 day of next month (JPK_VAT) 
and 2) upon request – ledgers (JPK_KR), bank statements (JPK_WB), inventory turnover 
(JPK_MAG), invoices (JPK_FA), revenue and expense ledger (JPK_PKPIR), and revenue 
register (JPK_EWP). The SAF-Ts support the obligation to keep electronic records and 
submit tax declarations (in the course of time, the SAF-T is intended to take over the role 
of tax declarations), and considerably reduce quarterly reports. The procedure can be 
compared to verification activities carried out distantly on an ongoing basis. The obligation 
to report using the SAF-T, introduced gradually, starting from the largest taxpayers and 
then smaller ones, yields results that are desirable from the point of view of the budget.  
The computerisation of VAT accounting brings along a number of hopes, but also fears 
related to costs and inconvenience of the system. While it is beyond any doubt that the 
SAF-T fosters and speeds up access to information needed to reconstruct various supply 
chains, one should not disregard the system's limitations, for the information in question is 
not exchanged on an ongoing basis, and is instead submitted within deadlines similar to 
those applicable to tax declarations. There are also concerns that the SAF-T will only help 
to diagnose formal errors (e.g. wrong Taxpayer Identification Number) and not actual 
fraud. Furthermore, the SAF-T does not envisage any measures that could help prevent 
fraud; also, information is not automatically transferred between tax authorities, law 
enforcement authorities and other institutions (e.g. the Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) 
as regards payment of social insurance contributions of employees reportedly carrying out 
said economic transactions). All these factors mean that the SAF-T on its own is not 
effective in fighting VAT fraud and should instead be perceived as an auxiliary instrument 
to the IT System of the Clearing House (STIR). 
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4. IT System of the Clearing House (STIR) 
The STIR System was introduced by special Act Amending Certain Acts to Combat the 
Use of the Financial Sector to Commit Treasury Fraud. The System provides the Head of 
the National Revenue Administration (NRA) with daily information on qualified entities' 
accounts run by banks and credit unions and on transactions at these accounts to analyse 
the risk of treasury fraud. Data concerning transactions by natural persons who are not 
qualified entities, resulting in a credit or debit on the accounts of qualified entities, are 
transmitted as aggregated data, which means the Head of the NRA does not receive the 
details of individual transactions, except for individual cases where such details may be 
provided upon a reasoned request. The underlying premise and objective is to make use of 
the IT system's capacity for the earliest possible identification of fraudulent behaviours or 
fraud-related risks.  Until recently, tax administration has been criticised for being so late 
in the measures it undertakes that the fiscal and penal-fiscal consequences are borne not by 
those in charge of criminal groups or the initiators of fraud mechanisms, but by those 
taxpayers who, as a general rule, are legitimate traders whose role in criminal dealings was 
minor and who do not take deliberate fraudulent action.  
In other words, the STIR System targets a crucial point in a fraudsters' activity: it deprives 
them of control over financial resources before a VAT fraud is conducted. It therefore 
seems that it is the most important and most effective mechanism for sealing the system. 
However, freezing of funds should be used with caution, as it may result in a "business 
death" of a random entity caused by a loss of  financial liquidity and shattered reputation 
among its business partners. Hence, the STIR System has raised fears and concerns (also 
due to the risk of data leakage) despite assurances to the effect that honest entrepreneurs 
have nothing to fear. 
 
5. VAT penalty rates 
The Act changing the act on VAT and some other acts introduced, starting from 1 January 
2017, VAT penalty rates, which at 20, 30, and 100% are intended to prevent and discourage 
under-declaration of output tax and over-declaration of input tax and tax returns. The 30% 
penalty rate may also be imposed for failing to submit a tax declaration or failing to pay the 
output tax. The 20% penalty rate is applicable to entities that amend their VAT tax returns 
or submit an overdue tax declaration and simultaneously pay the output tax. It is intended 
to encourage taxpayers to self-correct their declarations following a tax audit or an 
investigation procedure. The 100% penalty rate is applicable in case when an excessive 
amount of input tax declared by a taxpayer will stem from invoices: issues by a non-
existent entity, stating activities that did not take place, stating amounts devoid of reality – 
in the part concerning those invoice items stating amounts devoid of reality, stating 
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activities to which provisions of Article 58 and Article 83 of the Civil Code apply (e.g. 
ostensible acts, designed to circumvent the law). The increased rate applies to this part of 
amount that covers excessive amounts of input tax resulting from those invoices. The 
adopted solutions prove how firmly the authorities stand against taxpayers knowingly 
participating in tax fraud and obtaining illegitimate financial gains at a cost to the state's 
budget.  
The sanctions referred to above are not applied in the following cases: 1) correction of a 
declaration, subject to payment of the tax and accrued interest (prior to a tax audit/fiscal 
audit), 2) obvious errors, 3) errors as to the period for which the output or input tax were 
declared, as well as – in the aftermath of the Constitutional Tribunal judgment of 28 April 
1998 (case file K-17/97) – towards natural persons who are subject to penal fiscal liability 
for committing this act. Where the sanctions are applied, increased default interest is not 
applicable.  
These sanctions are designed to encourage taxpayers to do their tax returns correctly and 
ensure that irregularities are far more "costly" than any source of financing. That said, they 
are not used to combat tax fraud, as they concern entities that actually carry out economic 
activity and not so-called "vanishing" fraudsters and "strawpersons". 
 
6. Fuel Package and Energy Package 
The Act changing the act on VAT and some other acts and the Act changing the Energy 
Law and some other acts introduced solutions establishing a special method for accounting 
of VAT on intra-community acquisition of selected motor fuels, commonly referred to as 
the Fuel Package and Energy Package. The most important outcome of these changes was 
restricting the entry of fuel-carrying tanker trucks into Poland through the EU's internal 
borders. In 2015, the number of those trucks totalled approximately 750 per day, whereas 
in August 2016, it was merely 150 [PwC report "Countering shadow economy. Impact of 
regulations on liquid fuel industry", drawn up for the Global Compact Network Poland and 
Polish Oil Industry and Trade Organisation]. What follows is that the consumption of 
legally imported petrol and diesel fuels increased.  
The effectiveness of the adopted solutions in countering shadow economy in liquid fuel 
trading has been confirmed by results of a statistical analysis comparing the period from 
the entry of the fuel package into force until November 2017 and a corresponding period 
before the entry of the package. The analysis has shown that the value of intra-community 
supplies (ICS) of diesel fuel to Poland declared by other EU member states has decreased 
by approx. 40% (from EUR 2.27 billion to EUR 1.36 billion). Analysis of differences in 
reporting between EU member states and Poland has revealed discrepancies between what 
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allegedly entered Poland and what actually entered it at approx. EUR 5 billion (during the 
period between 01.2013–07.2016). In 2017, when the fuel package was in force during all 
reporting periods, the reporting differences plummeted, accompanied by an increase in the 
intra-community acquisition, especially of diesel fuel, which means that there has been a 
considerable decline in the quantity of oil coming from illegitimate sources in Poland. 
Hence, the fuel package has proved to be a straightaway success in countering shadow 
economy in the fuel sector: it has led to an increase in domestic sales of legitimate goods, 
and a decrease in imports from the EU member states (see annual reports by the Polish Oil 
Industry and Trade Organisation (POPiHN) for the years 2016 and 2017). That said, the 
package is not free from flaws – its design fault is not adjusting the VAT and excise duty 
systems, which results in interpretive doubts and possible abuse of the system [Rutkowski 
2018: 203-205], whereas an obvious negative consequence is the high cost of running of the 
package, which affects in particular dealers not affiliated with the market's major players, 
although this is where the majority of irregularities occurred. 
As a result of the changes, the number of detected irregularities (losses in VAT revenue) 
has gone up significantly, which also translates into a higher number of cancelled rights to 
purchase excise goods as a registered recipient and a higher number of withdrawn 
authorisations to operate a tax warehouse. 
 
7. Split payment mechanism 
The split payment mechanism was introduced in Poland by the Act changing the act on 
VAT and some other acts. At that time, the solution was already in use in the Czech 
Republic, Romania, and Italy, and outside the EU – in Turkey. However, in other countries 
it is rather limited and used on a selective basis, with respect to certain activities. One 
example may be the Netherlands, where split payment is only used by temporary work 
agencies for employee secondment services. In Romania, the scope and terms of 
application are similar to those used in Poland. In addition to that, Romania also uses the 
split payment mechanism in conjunction with additional incentives in the form of income 
tax reliefs. The mechanism can be used by purchasers who received an invoice stating an 
amount of tax declared, which means it is reserved for transactions of the taxpayer – 
taxpayer type and can only be used where the payment is in the form of a transfer of 
money. As a general rule, at least initially, split payment is optional, but its application 
entails certain consequences for both the seller and purchaser. While the seller receives 
total payment for his goods or services (gross amount, including the tax), but the payment 
is remitted to two separate bank accounts, with the seller having restricted access to the one 
where the VAT is deposited.  
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The optional character of the application of the split payment mechanism is highly relative, 
as it is the purchaser's sovereign decision whether he will pay the entire amount due to the 
primary account or whether he will have the bank transfer the VAT to the linked VAT 
account that he does not need to know. All the purchaser has to do is to include a specific 
instruction in the transfer message. In practice, while the seller, whom the purchaser 
wishes to pay using the split payment, does receive the entire amount, the bank 
automatically transfers the VAT amount to a separate account, which in the seller's 
account's transaction history is shown as a separate transfer. The split payment mechanism 
negates any joint liability of the purchaser for the seller's obligations regarding the goods 
specified in annex no. 13 to the Act, commonly known as sensitive goods. With respect to 
defaults occurring in relation to payments of at least 95% made using this mechanism, the 
default interest rate referred to in Article 56b of the Tax Ordinance Act does is not 
applicable. These incentives do not apply in the case of so-called "empty invoices" or 
invoices issued by a nonexistent entity.  
Nevertheless, the split payment mechanism is yet another deviation from the actual aim 
and VAT accounting technique presumably envisioned by the authors of this most 
important and most popular indirect tax. 
 
8. Increased sanctions for VAT fraud in the penal code 
The amendment to the penal code introduced into chapter XXXIV of the penal code 
special types of document fraud: Article 270a (material forgery) and Article 271a 
(intellectual forgery), which penalise both the act of forging (issuance) and use of a forged 
invoice [Radzikowski 2017 : 5-7]. The amendment provided for drastically harsher 
penalties, and for offences under Article 277a § 1, it went so far as to call for a penalty of 
deprivation of liberty for 25 years. The new provisions did not preclude the application of 
provisions  – also harsher – laid down in Article 17 of the penal fiscal code, which added 
the penalty of deprivation of liberty, excluding the possibility of voluntary submission to 
penalty under Article 17 of the penal fiscal code. Both amendments concern only offences 
against documents (invoices), and do not interfere with current penalisation of fraud or 
decrease of public liabilities. Nevertheless, both are characterised by a high degree of 
severity and far-reaching uncompromisingness of the adopted solutions, which are 
intended to counteract VAT fraud, especially by organised crime groups, putting the state's 
budget at risk of multibillion losses. Offences covered by these amendments are subject to a 
penalty of many years' imprisonment, with the exact punishment depending on the value 
of empty invoices, and the deprivation of liberty may also be accompanied by a fine.  
Another amendment to the penal code, effective since 27 April 2017, introduced the so-
called extended confiscation, legitimising e.g. the forfeiture of an enterprise that was the 
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instrument of an offence, as well as forfeiture of assets handed over to third parties free of 
charge or below their market value, forfeiture of assets despite the failure to issue a 
sentence (e.g. due to the death of the perpetrator, his flight, or mental illness), and other 
solutions. What strikes is the severity of the regulations referred to above, which have been 
constructed in such a way that the perpetrator must prove that the assets he has collected 
comes from legitimate sources.  
It is beyond any doubt that strengthening penal sanctions has a preventive effect. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to sentence organisers and beneficiaries of VAT fraud; instead, 
the penalties are usually imposed on the "strawpersons". The new regulations will further 
deepen the existing tendency: draconian punishments are applicable to invoice crimes, 
which are easier to prove, and not to the actual state property fraud. It is both surprising 
and disappointing that preparatory acts (the invoice forgery itself does not yield profits) are 
subject to more severe penalties than the "main" offence to the detriment of the state. There 
is also the risk that "ordinary" taxpayers, using false invoices under conditions of the so-
called dolus eventualis (Article 9 §1 in fine of the penal code) may be sentenced. 
 
9. Consolidation of revenue and customs authorities 
The Acts on National Revenue Administration and Provisions introducing the Act on 
National Revenue Administration reorganised revenue and customs authorities in order to 
improve their effectiveness, especially in enforcing public liabilities. On 1 March 2017, the 
existing customs authorities, fiscal administration, and revenue authorities, became 
consolidated and transformed into the National Revenue Administration, which is a 
specialised government administration engaged primarily in tasks related to obtaining 
revenues from taxes, duties, fees, and non-tax budget receivables. At this stage, it is not 
clear, however, whether the consolidation did guarantee a new quality in terms of 
coordination of measures, as it involved existing structures, and one of the deputy 
ministers for finance became both the Head of the National Revenue Administration, 
General Inspector of Fiscal Control, and an authority in charge of tax offices, customs and 
revenue offices, and chambers of fiscal administration as the Head of the National Revenue 
Administration. He was also assigned labour law tasks to be carried out for the director of 
the National Revenue Information, directors of chambers of fiscal administration, director 
of the School of Revenue Administration, and officers working in various organisational 
units of the office supporting the minister. Meanwhile, the tasks of the head of the 
organisational unit in matters related to labour law and service of officers in the chamber of 
fiscal administration and subordinate organisational units of the National Revenue 
Administration were assigned to directors of chambers of fiscal administration.  
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The proposed model of the National Revenue Administration is intended to facilitate  an 
effective collection of taxes, and streamline the handling of taxpayers, including provision 
of assistance to taxpayers and entrepreneurs in correct carrying out of their tax and fiscal 
obligations. It is also designed to ensure an effective administrative enforcement of 
receivables and reduce the existing tax gap, as well as improve the effectiveness of measures 
intended to counter tax fraud and recover tax and fiscal arrears. The National Revenue 
Administration is supposed to provide uniform and homogeneous case-law in tax and 
revenue matters throughout the county, ensure fast and reliable verification of data 
supplied by taxpayers in tax declarations and fiscal documents, and improve the 
effectiveness of control of how taxpayers carry out their tax obligations [Glumińska-Pawlic 
2018: 66-80]. However, available literature has emphasised views that the introduction of 
fiscal and revenue control which in procedural terms is significantly different from the tax 
audit under the Tax Ordinance Act and which, in case of entrepreneurs, also applies 
provisions laid down in the Business Law Act, deepens the dualism of control by the 
National Revenue Administration bodies. This has led to the establishments of three legal 
regimes governing the compliance with provisions of tax law: customs and revenue control 
(subject to provisions of the Act on the National Revenue Administration and the Tax 
Ordinance Law), tax audit of entrepreneurs (Business Law and Tax Ordinance in the 
absence of specific provisions in the former), and tax audit (carried out solely pursuant to 
provisions laid down in the Tax Ordinance Law [Strzelec 2017: 16].  
It should be stressed that the efficiency of tax administration plays a major role in the 
effectiveness of VAT collection. In addition to the shape of the tax system, which comprises 
elements such as the standard VAT rate or the number of preferential tariff rates, an 
important role is also played by administrative costs entailed in its functioning, expressed 
as a percentage of income [Agha, Haughton 1996: 303-308], as well as the society's 
perception of the fairness of the tax system, effectiveness of the legal system and tax abuse 
punishability rate [Christie, Holzner 2006: 11]. Increasing expenditure on tax 
administration translates (in relation to net revenues) translates into higher VAT collection 
rates. Both the well-perceived effectiveness of the tax system and effectiveness of the legal 
system, as well as a high conviction rate for tax evasion contribute to reducing the VAT gap 
[Gajewski 2018: 63-65]. 
 
10. Conclusions 
The changes introduced in Poland have led to a marked increase in tax revenues in 
comparison to the period before measures designed to seal the tax system were undertaken. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be firmly established to what extent the increase in revenues 
resulted from an upturn in the economy, and to what extent it was caused by 
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organisational measures, measures designed to close loopholes in the system, and shifting 
of VAT returns. While it is beyond any doubt that improving the effectiveness of collection 
of taxes was an important factor in increasing the budget revenues, closing the loopholes in 
the tax system in itself cannot be considered the only factor leading to an increase in tax 
revenue. However, it may be assumed that sustaining this trend will be increasingly 
difficult as in the first place it was only possible to inactivate specialised international 
groups creating highly complicated mechanisms based on chain and carousel transactions. 
While it is true that thanks to the Standard Audit File for Tax the tax authorities have 
access to some information without having to carry out tax audits or investigation 
procedures, the system focuses in formal errors, and fails to distinguish between a genuine 
invoice and a false one in the material sense. Furthermore, the SAF-T does not diagnose 
unrecorded trade, i.e. the absence of invoices or receipts when they should have been 
issued. In addition, with the exception of the IT System of the Clearing House (STIR) the 
undertaken measures ignore a crucial moment in VAT fraud: the payment of public funds. 
This is what the authorities should focus on, however from the organisation point of view 
controlling the ever-growing number of declarations serving as a basis for VAT returns. 
The increase in taxpayers' obligations and strengthening of powers of tax authorities, as 
caused by the changes in the law, entails a number of potentially negative consequences. 
Fiscally effective solutions usually entail  considerable interference in the taxpayer's rights, 
which is the case with the majority of the cases analysed herein. Meanwhile, time will tell 
whether the National Revenue Administration bodies will prove to be modern and 
taxpayer-friendly, and whether they will efficiently collect levies and at the same time 
ensure financial security of the state. That said, it is difficult at this point to determine 
whether the functioning of the National Revenue Administration will indeed make it 
possible to avoid the undertaking of measures that are burdensome on both taxpayers and 
entrepreneurs as with the high level of interference, the amendments basically do not 
envisage any major instruments for the protection of the taxpayer. 
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